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The motives and performance of cross-border acquirers from emerging 
economies: Comparison between Chinese and Indian firms 
 
 
Rekha Rao Nicholson and Julie Salaber 
 
Abstract 
During the recent decade, the world has witnessed the rapid growth of MNEs from emerging 
economies. Their increasing participation in cross-border mergers and acquisitions has raised great 
attention in the extant literature. This study evaluates the value creation from these cross-border 
transactions from two representative emerging countries, namely China and India, and determines 
factors that result in the different performance of these international acquisition activities. Cross-
border acquisitions conducted by these countries’ companies indeed lead to significant shareholder 
wealth creation. Furthermore, Indian shareholders are more likely to benefit from deals in small 
cultural distance countries, while Chinese investors gain from the cross-border expansion of 
manufacturing companies. Location also affects the performance of cross-border acquisitions, with 
acquisitions into developed countries generating higher returns to shareholders. Our sample consists 
of 203 Indian and 63 Chinese cross-border deals over the period 2000-2010 and our results hold after 
controlling for various deal-level and firm-level characteristics. 
 
Keywords: Cross-border acquisitions; Short-term performance; China; India; Competitive advantage; 
Cultural distance 
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1.   Introduction  
Historically, in their efforts to internationalize, emerging-market (EM) firms have used strategies 
ranging from exports to equity investment (Guillen, 2000) and joint ventures (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000). The recent decades have witnessed the dramatic rise of firms from emerging economies, 
especially those from China and India, adopting cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as the 
main approach to realize internationalization (Athreye & Kapur, 2009; Aulakh, Kotabe, & Teegen, 
2000; Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010; UNCTAD, 2011). According to the World 
Investment Report 2010, the outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from emerging economies has 
increased to a record high of 25% of the global total (UNCTAD, 2010). The increasing number of 
cross-border acquisitions by EM firms provides the impetus for growing outward investment 
(UNCTAD, 2010). Outbound cross-border acquisitions by EM firms have increased from $37 billion 
in 2004 to $182 billion in 2008 – a staggering rise of 392%; and the $182 billion (for 2008) makes up 
66% of the total FDI outflows from emerging countries (UNCTAD, 2009). During the first decade of 
21st century, Chinese firms completed 450 outbound acquisitions, whereas Indian firms acquired 812 
foreign companies (UNCTAD, 2010). Figure 1 shows that in China the number of completed cross-
border M&As increased from 36 in 2000 to 135 in 2010 and the value of deals jumped to over US$32 
billion in 2010. Meanwhile in India (Figure 2), the number of deals has also increased from 54 in 
2000 to 133 in 2010 and the value of deals exceeds US$23 billion. 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
So far however, despite this booming trend, researchers fail to address whether the extant 
hypothesized internationalization theories (Dunning, 2001; von Eije & Wiegerinck, 2010) are 
applicable to acquirers from developing economies since many differences exist between developed 
and developing markets. Also, the issues whether overseas M&As by EM firms can create value for 
the bidders and which factors play an important role in the M&A performance are worth paying 
attention to. Accordingly, this paper mainly uses event study metrics to investigate and compare the 
short-term performance of cross-border acquirers in China and India and puts forward the possible 
explanations for the differences. We had borrowed from two strands of theories to frame our 
arguments, namely the resource-based view (Accenture, 2006; Barney, 1991; Deng, 2007; Wang & 
Boateng, 2007) which talks about strategic resource seeking, and Dunning’s seminal work (Dunning, 
2001) which relates to market seeking activities linked to fast entry into foreign markets (Buckley, et 
al., 2007). 
The proposed contribution of this paper is threefold. First, the existing literature lacks 
comparative studies on cross-border M&A performance in emerging markets (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; 
Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2011) though several of these countries have been studied singularly 
(Gubbi, et al., 2010; Wang & Boateng, 2007; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). Second, this paper 
invokes the major motives for cross-border M&As undertaken by EM firms (Deng, 2007; Deng, 
2009; Li, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007; Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012; Wang & Boateng, 2007). These 
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factors help us understand the underlying reasons that have led to cross-border acquisitions by 
Chinese and Indian companies and identify “the conditions under which acquisitions make sense as a 
path to superior performance” (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Third, our analysis mainly uses 
regression metrics to do the comparative work, which is rare in the international business literature. 
We firstly conduct an event study to compare the short-term performance of international acquisitions 
between Chinese and Indian markets. Then we use cross-sectional regressions to test the different 
patterns of cross-border acquisitions in both countries, and find the determinants that have an 
influential effect on their short-term performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a summary of the 
relevant literature and important theoretical frameworks that are essential to our understanding of the 
motivations and performance of cross-border M&As in emerging economies. In Section 3, we 
compare the expected different features of overseas acquisitions between Chinese and Indian firms, 
and develop our hypotheses relative to their short-term performance. Section 4 outlines the sample 
and methodology applied, and Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 provides concluding 
comments and discussion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Performance of cross-border M&As 
The extensive literature on the short-term performance of bidders from developed markets 
(especially the U.S. market) finds that bidding firms earn negative abnormal returns on average (Kim, 
Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011; Klossek, Linke, & Nippa, 2012; Kobrin, 1979). The main argument 
for this finding is that corporate diversification is redundant as investors can hold diversified 
portfolios. Regarding cross-border M&As, several papers investigate foreign investment of 
developed-country companies but the evidence is mixed. The short-term performance of U.S. bidders 
targeting a foreign company has been found to be either positive (Doukas & Travlos, 1988; Kostova, 
Roth, & Dacin, 2008) or negative (Ghemawat, 2001). Doukas and Travlos (1988) invoke the theory of 
corporate multinationalism to explain the positive abnormal return. Firms have a greater strategic 
advantage in international markets than investors. They can increase their market value by expanding 
their existing multinational network. However, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) argue that 
international diversification can be considered as value decreasing (at least for shareholders) if the 
costs are higher than the benefits. These costs include greater competition for corporate control, 
increase in agency problems, greater complexity and inefficient cross-subsidization. In the U.K., 
international bidders do not earn any significant abnormal return around the announcement date, 
irrespective of the country of the target company (Gregory & McCorriston, 2005). Finally, a Dutch 
study (Slangen, 2006) shows that the abnormal return actually depends on the level of post-acquisition 
integration. 
In spite of increasing involvement of Chinese and Indian companies in cross-border activities, 
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research on this topic is limited and results are not convincing. A cross-country study over 13 
emerging markets (Aybar & Ficici, 2009) finds that bidders earn a negative abnormal return when 
acquiring abroad. On the contrary, Bhagat, et al. (2011) study 698 cross-border acquisitions by bidders 
from 8 emerging countries and conclude that these acquirers experience a positive and significant 
market response around the announcement date. Similarly, Gubbi, et al. (2010) show that cross-border 
acquisitions from Indian companies earn a positive abnormal return over the period 2000-2007. 
 
2.2. Motives for cross-border M&As 
The traditionally dominant theory of internationalization is the Dunning’s (1980, 1988, 1993) 
OLI paradigm based on the exploitation of three different advantages: Ownership, Location and 
Internationalization. Dunning (1993) suggests three main motives for foreign investments: foreign 
market seeking, efficiency seeking (i.e., cost reduction), and resource seeking. Since the rapid growth 
of cross-border M&As from EM companies, scholars have investigated their motivations for 
internationalization and agree that this traditional analysis cannot totally explain the rise in cross-
border M&As from emerging markets (Athreye & Kapur, 2009; Buckley, et al., 2007; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008; Gubbi, et al., 2010; Li, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui & Yip, 2008; Sun, et al., 2012). 
Authors have applied Dunning’s first motive (foreign market seeking) to developing-country FDI and 
suggest that EM firms become international acquirers “for traditional trade supporting reasons”, e.g. 
to access distribution networks and to facilitate the export of domestic products (Buckley, et al., 
2007). However, recent research suggests that the motives for EM firms to expand abroad are 
fundamentally different from those of developed-economy firms (Buckley, et al., 2007; Fortanier & 
Tulder, 2009; Li, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007). For instance, Luo and Tung (2007) argue that EM firms 
pursuing overseas M&As are driven by asset seeking rather than asset exploiting. 
Thus the first motive for cross-border M&As from EM companies is based on strategic resource 
seeking. The resource-based view literature suggests that capabilities and resources are the key 
determinants of a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). According to this resource-based 
theory, the key motivation for foreign acquisitions is to gain access to strategic assets such as natural 
resources, product differentiation, patent-protected technologies, superior managerial and marketing 
skills, as well as achieving economies of scale (Accenture, 2006; Athreye & Kapur, 2009; Chen, 
2008; Cui & Jiang, 2010; Deng, 2007; Deng, 2009; Kumar, 2009; Rui & Yip, 2008; Wang & Boateng, 
2007). Lacking such strategic resources, EM firms use cross-border M&As as the most effective way 
to improve their competitive advantage and performance (Gubbi, et al., 2010). Moreover, global firms 
which aim at acquiring new assets and new capabilities tend to create more M&A value than 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) pursuing a strategy based on the exploitation of their existing 
capabilities (Chittoor & Ray, 2007). In other words, strategic assets are necessary to meet the needs 
for bolstering economic development at home and compete more effectively against their global rivals 
at home and abroad (Luo & Tung, 2007; UNCTAD, 2006). This strategic resource seeking seems to 
5 
 
be the main motivation of cross-border acquisitions for Chinese companies as nearly half of China’s 
outbound investment is focused on securing natural resources (Dietz, Orr, & Xing, 2008). In order to 
access advanced management and marketing skills, EM companies should be expected to target firms 
from developed markets, i.e., characterized by higher-quality complementary resources (Gubbi, et al., 
2010). As suggested by Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (2001), high-value front-end 
capabilities and resources available in developed markets, when combined with the back-end low-cost 
capabilities in emerging markets, can create uniquely valuable resource combinations to achieve 
higher market valuation and globalization realization. Gubbi, et al. (2010) actually show that Indian 
bidders earn a higher return when targeting a more developed country.  
Cross-border acquisitions by EM companies are also motivated by a fast entry to foreign 
markets. Many studies consider cross-border M&As as the fastest means for MNEs, especially EM 
firms, to expand their product and consumer markets internationally (Belderbos, 2003; Chen & 
Findlay, 2003; Deng, 2007; Deng, 2009; Li, 2007; Wang & Boateng, 2007). The acceleration of 
globalization implies increased competition and shorter product life cycles; firms have to react 
quickly to stay in line with other competitors. In order to access new marketing network and potential 
clients, the takeover of an existing firm in a foreign market with an established distribution system is 
much easier and more preferable than building up a global organization from scratch (Chen & 
Findlay, 2003). This is particularly true for EM companies targeting developed markets, as the costs 
of finding, negotiating and enforcing a cooperative agreement are much greater than the costs of 
direct control (Bowen & Jones, 1986; Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Hennart, 1989). Indeed the 
internationalization process can be more or less time-consuming, difficult and expensive depending 
on factors such as geographical, psychic or cultural distance and institutional constraints (Barkema, 
Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Boateng & Glaister, 2003; Luo & Tung, 2007). For instance, a large body of 
literature suggests that cultural distance is relevant to cross-border acquisition performance (Antia, 
Lin, & Pantzalis, 2007; Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Brock, 2005; He, Bin, & Chen, 2008; López-Duarte & 
Vidal-Suárez, 2010; Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2011; Morosini, 1998; Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 
1998; Steigner & Sutton, 2011). Most MNEs use cross-border acquisitions as a fast and easy way to 
acquire strategic assets and enter new markets, but we argue that this ease of access is much greater 
for Indian bidders than for Chinese companies. Indeed, India is a commonwealth country due to its 
status of former British colony; hence it has long been influenced by western language, politics, 
business and culture. Thus Indian companies seeking to enter new markets, especially developed 
markets, will encounter a lower clash of culture (and thus benefit from a faster entry) than their 
Chinese counterparts (Buckley, Forsans, & Munjal, 2012). 
 
Overall, the reaction of EM shareholders to the announcement of cross-border acquisitions is 
mixed, and the motives for these foreign transactions appear to be fundamentally different than in the 
case of developed-country acquirers. 
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2.3. Other factors affecting M&A performance 
In order to genuinely explain the performance of cross-border M&As from China and India, we 
need to control for other factors that are likely to affect any domestic or cross-border acquirer (both 
from developed and emerging countries). Following extensive literature on M&A performance 
(Cakici, Hessel, & Tandon, 1996; Ghemawat, 2001; Gubbi, et al., 2010; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1991; 
Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005), we use several control variables that have been found impacting 
bidder’s abnormal returns. These factors are related to deal characteristics (mode of payment, 
percentage acquired, relative deal size and target status) and bidder characteristics (industry 
relatedness, prior presence and state ownership). We present here the literature behind these control 
variables. 
2.3.1. Mode of payment 
Extensive studies have illustrated that cash-financed M&As yield positive abnormal returns, 
whereas stock-financed M&As generate negative abnormal returns (Blackburn, Dark, & Hanson, 
1997; Brown & Ryngaert, 1991; Faccio & Masulis, 2005; Mann & Kohli, 2009; Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008; Smith & Kim, 1994). Information asymmetry about the true value of the acquirer’s 
stock and the disciplinary role of debt incurred for cash financing are widely accepted as the reasons 
that cause this difference (Yook, 2003). Myers and Majluf (1984) consider the signaling role of equity. 
Due to information asymmetry in the imperfect market, a manager who has more information than 
investors knows more about the firm’s value. Thus, if bad news is about to come, the manager will 
attempt to ‘beat the market’ by issuing overvalued equity. In other words, a firm offering stock as 
payment signals to the investors that the stock is overvalued. Jensen (1986) considers the disciplinary 
role of debt that can mitigate agency problems. Investors would have more confidence in the prospect 
of the deals since increasing debt commits managers to make more effort.  
2.3.2. Level of control 
Several studies consider the acquisition of a controlling stake as the opportunistic behavior of 
acquirers to capture strategic assets (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). For 
M&As involving developed-economy acquirers and EM targets, Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2004) 
verify that the achievement of a controlling stake of the target firm has a positive and significant 
impact on the value of the acquiring firm. However, for cross-border M&As undertaken by EM firms, 
Aybar and Ficici (2009) only find a positive impact of control level on the firm value in the univariate 
test, but fail to confirm the significance of the level of control in their multivariate analysis.  
2.3.3. Relative deal size 
It is generally believed that firms can achieve economies of scale in their production 
management, marketing, distribution, etc. through expanding their capital investments in related 
fields. The same logic applies to cross-border M&As: successful cross-border transactions leading to 
large size may generate synergies that make post-acquisition firm value exceed the simple addition of 
the value of both firms (Lamacchia, 1997). Aybar and Ficici (2009) state that EM firms may also gain 
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from increased market presence and capital exploration efficiency globally, which ultimately enhance 
their profitability. However, some researchers identify several drawbacks associated with investment 
size. Information asymmetry, even more challenging in cross-border transactions, leads to 
misidentification of synergies and overestimation of post-acquisition value (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). 
Large deals may also take longer than expected, which could result in negative market reactions 
(Mulherin & Boone, 2000). Empirically, the relative deal size is a significant factor for developed-
country acquirers (Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Slangen, 2006; von Eije & Wiegerinck, 2010) but 
not for EM multinationals (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). 
2.3.4. Status of target 
Numerous studies investigate whether the performance of M&As differs when targets are 
publicly listed companies or privately held (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Capron & Shen, 2007; Gubbi, et 
al., 2010; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Yook, 2003). Key differences between private and public 
firms are the quantity and quality of information available to the public, as well as the ownership 
structure. Acquirers would pay more (and thus earn lower returns) if the target is listed since the 
transaction price needs to satisfy the interests of a diverse group of shareholders (Choi & Russell, 
2004; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). Overall, empirical studies find a significant premium for 
bidders targeting a private company compared to acquisitions of publicly listed companies (Aybar & 
Ficici, 2009; Fuller, et al., 2002; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). Gubbi, et al. (2010) do not find the 
status of the target to be a significant factor for Indian acquisitions.  
2.3.5. Industry Relatedness 
The potential of synergies depends, to a large extent, on the similarity between the target and 
acquirer industries. These similarities “facilitate strategic fit through production rationalization, 
economies of scale and scope, diffusion of know-how, and lower managerial slack” (Bertrand & 
Zitouna, 2008). In other words, if the target and the acquirer belong to the same industry, operational 
and financial synergies are more likely to be achieved in the cross-border M&As. Many studies have 
confirmed that a higher abnormal return is reported for related acquisitions than non-related ones 
(Akbulut & Matsusaka, 2010; Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Slangen, 
2006).  
2.3.6. Prior presence 
The prior experience in the target industry and/or country is also an important factor that needs to 
be taken into account. According to Doukas and Travlos (1988), the positive-multinational-network 
hypothesis considers that the shares of the bidder are likely to experience greater impact from 
country- or industry-diversifying acquisitions. The authors find supporting evidence that the bidder 
firm can create larger abnormal returns when expanding into a new industry or a new country, 
especially in less developed countries. More recently, the evidence about the prior experience in the 
target country is mixed, i.e., this factor has been shown to be positive (Slangen, 2006), negative (von 
Eije & Wiegerinck, 2010) or not significant (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). 
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2.3.7. State-owned companies in China 
Although Chinese stock markets are entering the era of free float, many Chinese firms possessing 
critical industrial and financial resources are still controlled in majority by the central and local 
government. Such state-holding enterprises have large firm size, stable operating situation, and some 
of them have accumulated some experience of overseas operations through Greenfield investments. 
Therefore, they have a greater chance to conduct successful overseas M&As compared to other 
companies. Besides, one major policy objective of the Chinese government is to promote competent 
enterprises to go global (Cai, 1999; Chen & Findlay, 2003; Deng, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo, Xue, 
& Han, 2010; Singh, 2009; Sun, et al., 2012), and state-holding enterprises are naturally more likely 
to expand abroad (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Boateng, 2012) and receive support from the 
government (e.g. in financing large-scale M&A transactions). However some principal-principal 
conflicts arise when the government is the majority owner, i.e., minority shareholders might have 
divergent interests and thus react negatively to a proposed cross-border M&A deal. Chen and Young 
(2010) find supporting evidence for this principal-principal hypothesis. Comparatively, Indian firms 
have more open market mechanisms and friendly government policies, where private enterprises can 
easily finance their cross-border M&As in the stock market (Accenture, 2006). Sun, et al. (2012) 
confirm that Chinese state-owned enterprises generally play the leading role in cross-border M&As, 
whereas private enterprises play the leading role in India. We thus use this variable as control variable 
only for Chinese transactions. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
Based on previous theory and evidence, we develop here several hypotheses related to the 
respective motivations of Chinese and Indian acquirers to target foreign companies, and the impact of 
such motives on the bidder’s performance. Although Chinese and Indian foreign transactions share a 
number of common features, they also have significant differences. Common characteristics to China 
and India are for instance that (i) the pace of growth in M&A activity is strongly influenced by 
government policies (Athreye & Kapur, 2009; Chen & Findlay, 2003; Khanna & Palepu, 2006; Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Luo, et al., 2010; Nayyar, 2008; Sun, et al., 2012; Witt & Lewin, 2007), (ii) the level of 
internationalization of large companies is still lower than that of most developed-country firms 
(Fortanier & Tulder, 2009; Li, 2007), and (iii) most transactions in both countries are friendly 
purchase agreements (Sun, et al., 2012). However we argue that the primary motivation for Chinese 
and Indian companies going abroad is different and that such difference will be reflected in the 
shareholder reaction to the announcement of cross-border deals. According to the Accenture Report 
(2006) “Chinese firms invest heavily in emerging economies in Africa, Central Asia and Latin 
America, largely to secure the natural resources essential for their own economic growth”, whereas 
Indian acquirers prefer to target firms in developed countries “to gain market share as well as to 
provide a platform for regional growth”. 
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3.1. Competitive advantage and performance 
Applying the resource-based theory to Chinese and Indian companies, we argue that the key 
motivation for their foreign acquisitions is to gain access to strategic assets, but that Chinese and 
Indian acquirers are targeting different types of strategic assets. Chinese MNEs are more interested in 
gaining natural resources and superior managerial and marketing skills in order to improve their 
competitive advantage in manufactured products (Athreye & Kapur, 2009; Chen, 2008; Cui & Jiang, 
2010; Deng, 2007; Deng, 2009; Kumar, 2009; Rui & Yip, 2008; Wang, et al., 2012; Wang & Boateng, 
2007), whereas cross-border acquisitions from Indian companies primarily involve a technology-
intensive industry (e.g. software and pharmaceutical) in which India has a high competitive advantage 
(Arora, Arunachalam, Asundi, & Fernandes, 2001; Ethiraj, Kale, Krishnan, & Singh, 2005; Miozzo & 
Grimshaw, 2008; Sun, et al., 2012). In both cases, we want to test whether shareholders recognize and 
value this strategic resource seeking motive. 
Dietz, et al. (2008) suggest that nearly half of China’s FDI focuses on securing natural resources. 
Sun, et al. (2012) confirm that, in order to fuel their rapid economic growth, large Chinese companies 
need to consolidate their core competitive advantages which are cheap labor and rich natural 
resources. Chinese firms enjoy a comparative advantage in manufacturing-oriented industries and, 
considered the ‘workshop of the world’ China has the potential to become the dominant global 
supplier of manufactured goods. As a matter of fact, the majority of cross-border M&As by Chinese 
firms occurs in the manufacturing industry, and more commonly carried out by state-owned 
enterprises (Athreye & Kapur, 2009; Sun, et al., 2012). We thus investigate whether Chinese 
shareholders react positively to acquisition announcements from companies enjoying a competitive 
advantage (i.e., belonging to the manufacturing industry) and willing to consolidate natural resources 
important for their production. The market reaction should be positive if shareholders recognize and 
value this strategic resource seeking and competitive advantage. 
H1a: Chinese bidders experience more favorable abnormal returns when their main activity is in 
manufacturing. 
Rather than natural resources, Indian companies invest abroad in order to gain more advanced 
resources such as leading technologies and knowledge-based abilities (Buckley, et al., 2012). These 
foreign technological assets are known to improve the performance and competitive advantage of the 
firm (Tsang, Yip, & Toh, 2008). Indeed Indian MNEs have a competitive advantage in business 
services, which are characterized by high customization, high intangibility, and simultaneity of 
production and consumption (Boddewyn, Halbrich, & Perry, 1986; Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 
1985). Moreover, human resources in service sector firms are mobile and easily re-trainable for 
alternative use (Erramilli & Rao, 1993). Thus the benefits of cross-border acquisitions are potentially 
higher for service sector MNEs compared to non-service sector MNEs, and several service sector 
firms in India, especially in computer programming services, have experienced such benefits. For 
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instance, the acquisitions of firms such as the US software company UII by Cyberspace (2001), 
German AD Solutions by India’s leading software firm NIIT Ltd (2002), and British Alcatel SA’s 
fraud management software unit by Subex Systems Ltd (2004) significantly expanded the bidder’s 
markets and client bases. Thus we can test this strategic resource seeking motive the same way we 
tested it for China. We expect shareholders to recognize and value cross-border acquisitions from 
Indian companies enjoying a competitive advantage (i.e., in the service industry).  
H1b: Indian bidders experience more favorable abnormal returns when their main activity is in the 
service industry. 
 
3.2. Developed target country and performance 
Another way to test the resource seeking hypothesis is to investigate whether Chinese and Indian 
shareholders react positively to acquisitions into developed countries characterized by higher-quality 
complementary resources (Buckley, et al., 2012). Indeed emerging market MNEs invest in more 
advanced countries to access or augment, rather than to exploit their ownership advantages (Dunning, 
1998, 2006), thus acquiring assets with potential to create competitive advantages (Marinova, Child, 
& Marinov, 2011). Foreign acquisitions in developed countries are an efficient and fast way to acquire 
strategic or knowledge-based resources usually not available in the domestic market or in other 
emerging markets (Gubbi, et al., 2010). Moreover, high-value front-end capabilities and resources 
available in developed markets, combined with the back-end low-cost capabilities from emerging-
market MNEs can create uniquely valuable resource combinations to achieve higher market valuation 
(Harrison, et al., 2001). 
Thus, driven by this strategic asset seeking, both Chinese and Indian acquirers would obtain 
greater value if targeting more developed countries as these transactions would help them garner 
strategic resources not readily available at home (Chan, Isobe, & Makino, 2008; Gubbi, et al., 2010). 
Hence we expect that acquisitions into developed countries are valued positively by their 
shareholders.  
H2: Chinese and Indian bidders experience more favorable abnormal returns when they target more 
advanced economies. 
 
3.3. Moderating effect of cultural distance on fast entry 
Finally, we test how the other main motive for cross-border M&As (fast entry to foreign markets) 
is influenced by the cultural distance between the target and bidder countries. EM companies use 
cross-border acquisitions as a fast and easy way to enter new markets and acquire strategic assets 
(Boateng, Qian, & Tianle, 2008). Although this mode of entry is considered as being the quickest, 
easiest and most preferable means to access new marketing network and potential customers 
(Belderbos, 2003; Chen & Findlay, 2003; Deng, 2007; Deng, 2009; Li, 2007; Wang & Boateng, 
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2007), the process can be more or less difficult and expensive depending on firm-specific and 
country-specific (dis)advantages (Barkema, et al., 1996; Boateng & Glaister, 2003; Luo & Tung, 
2007). The extant literature mentions the relevance of cultural distance in cross-border acquisition 
performance (Antia, et al., 2007; Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Brock, 2005; He, et al., 2008; López-Duarte & 
Vidal-Suárez, 2010; Malhotra, et al., 2011; Morosini, 1998; Morosini, et al., 1998; Steigner & Sutton, 
2011). Indeed, cross-border acquisitions are subject to liabilities of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) that 
can hinder the realization of intended synergies (Brock, 2005). Though acquiring an existing company 
has the advantage of fast entry, buying a company with cultural difference and likely prospect of 
cultural conflict would force an acquirer to engage in cultural turnaround of the unit which are costly 
and time-consuming (Hofstede, 1989). This limits the returns that an acquirer can achieve from fast 
entry into a target’s country. The organizational culture of bidders and targets is also important in 
determining the ease of access to new product and consumer markets. For instance, sociocultural 
factors such as mutual respect and trust make cross-border post-acquisition capability transfer and 
resource sharing easier (Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Håkanson, 2000; Stahl & Voigt, 2008). We argue in 
this paper that Chinese MNEs face higher liabilities of foreignness (or cultural disadvantages) than 
Indian bidders in their foreign acquisitions and thus cannot benefit from a fast entry into foreign 
markets as Indian companies do.  
On one side, the fast entry in foreign markets is a significant motivation for cross-border 
acquisitions from Indian MNEs as they can benefit from an organizational culture that favors a faster 
access to foreign product and consumer markets. As pointed out by the Accenture Report (2006), 
Indian acquirers fulfill the needs to gain new markets via overseas M&As. Moreover, Indian outward 
FDI involves mostly private sector firms, typically large, diversified business houses (Athreye & 
Kapur, 2009; Sun, et al., 2012) which need to react quickly to increased global competition. This new 
market seeking is facilitated by the fact that India is a commonwealth country and has experienced a 
long-term influence from western countries. As a consequence of India being a former British colony, 
English is the official language in India, suggesting that Indian firms have higher multinational 
communication skills and fewer obstacles for global integration, especially with the increasing use of 
English in global business (Buckley, et al., 2012). Moreover, if we look at Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
dimensions, India has a smaller score than China on the masculinity-femininity (MAS) dimension, 
suggesting that India is a more feminine society than China. Feminine societies encourage the 
building of trust and empathy within organizations (Hofstede, 1980) and existing evidence shows that 
the creation of trust improves synergy realization within cross-border M&As (Birkinshaw, et al., 
2000; Stahl & Voigt, 2008).  
On the other side, Chinese MNEs face a high potential clash of culture in their cross-border 
acquisitions as many Chinese managers crucially lack fluent communication skills, cross-cultural 
knowledge, foreign management experience and fluency in English (Dietz, et al., 2008). Hence, the 
organizational culture of Chinese acquirers is not recognized as a factor that could ease and speed up 
12 
 
the access to foreign markets. We thus suggest that Chinese acquirer’s attempts at fast entry into 
foreign markets are not facilitated by the reality of engaging with diverse target country business 
environments (Hofstede, 1989).  
Overall, only Indian acquirers’ motivation for fast entry into foreign markets is affected by 
cultural distance and their shareholders recognize and value this motive. We use the cultural distance 
between the home and host countries as a proxy for the cultural advantage (disadvantage) of Indian 
(Chinese) bidders in foreign markets. Hence we expect cultural distance to significantly impact the 
abnormal returns of acquirers in India, i.e., shareholders react positively to acquisitions into countries 
having a minimal cultural difference with India, but we do not expect such effect in China. 
H3: Indian bidders experience more significant abnormal returns when they target countries with a 
small cultural distance as compared to Chinese bidders.  
 
3.4. Measurement of predictor variables 
The first set of explanatory variables is related to the strategic resource hypothesis. What we are 
interested in is whether there is a positive relationship between the abnormal return for shareholders 
and the competitive advantage of Chinese (Indian) bidders. The first dummy variable, 
MANUFACTURING (SERVICES), takes the value of one if the Chinese (Indian) bidder’s main 
activity is in the manufacturing (services) industry, zero otherwise. This measure captures the 
competitive advantage of Chinese and Indian acquirers (H1). The second dummy, DEVELOPED, 
takes value of one if the host country is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and/or a member of the advanced economies list from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Since the OECD and the IMF list comprise 32 and 35 (respectively) highly 
industrialized countries, several authors use these memberships as proxies for developed countries 
(Buckley, et al., 2007; Gubbi, et al., 2010). Generally, target firms in developed countries own more 
advanced tangible and intangible assets that can provide more core competitive advantages to bidder 
firms (H2).  
In order to test the fast entry hypothesis (H3), we use the cultural distance between the bidder’s 
and the target’s country to measure the cultural (dis)advantage of Chinese and Indian acquirers. 
Cultural distance has been widely related to cross-border acquisition performance and various 
measures of cultural distance have been used. The most common measure is based on Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural dimensions, which are power distance index (PDI), individuality-collectivism (IDV), 
masculinity-femininity (MAS), and uncertainty avoidance index (UAI). Despite many criticisms, 
there is extensive evidence of the validity and reliability of Hofstede’s national cultural scores 
(Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Morosini & Singh, 1994). Following previous 
literature (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Morosini, et al., 1998), we calculate a composite measure of cultural 
distance as: 
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where Ii is the index for each cultural dimension, ; f denotes the foreign 
country and h denotes the home country (either China or India). This composite index has been 
widely used in the international business literature (Barkema, et al., 1996; Flores & Aguilera, 2007; 
Lee, Shenkar, & Li, 2008; Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Meschi & Riccio, 2008; Park & Ungson, 1997; 
Thomas & Grosse, 2001; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). Although other measures of cultural 
distance have been suggested (Barkema, et al., 1996; Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006; Park & Ungson, 
1997; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985; Schwartz, 1994; Shenkar, 2001), Drogendijk and Slangen (2006) show 
that “it may be premature to dismiss Hofstede’s work as outdated or as inaccurately reflecting national 
cultures”. We also calculate the cultural distance between the home and host country on each 
individual cultural dimension, as suggested by Shenkar (2001). Following Aybar and Ficici (2009), we 
thus calculate CD_if for each dimension i as: . As emphasized in section 3.3, we 
expect the short-term performance of Indian cross-border acquisitions to be affected by cultural distance, 
especially on the MAS dimension. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data selection 
The data on Chinese and Indian acquisitions from January 2000 to December 2010 have been 
obtained from Thomson One database. We screen this database according to the following criteria: (i) 
the acquirer is either a Chinese company listed on Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, or an 
Indian company listed on Bombay Stock Exchange; (ii) the target country is different from the bidder 
country; (iii) the acquirer obtains at least 50% of the shares of the target (to focus only on majority-
stock acquisitions) and (iv) the transaction has been completed. In order to compute abnormal returns, 
we collect data on daily stock returns and daily market returns from Thomson DataStream. The 
joining of both Thomson One and DataStream data led to a sample which consists of 389 cross-border 
acquisitions, including 310 from Indian companies and 79 from Chinese bidders. For the Chinese 
market portfolio, we use two different indices, the Shanghai SE Composite and the Shenzhen SE 
Composite, depending on whether the bidder is listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. For the Indian market portfolio, we use the index BSE-500 which represents the 500 
largest capitalizations on the Bombay Stock Exchange. In order to collect all characteristics 
information for our control variables, we use both Thomson One and Thomson DataStream.1 From 
our sample of 389 deals, we keep only the deals for which we have available data on all our control 
                                                             
1 We also use the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) database to control for state ownership in 
China. 
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variables, which narrows our final sample down to 63 deals for China and 203 deals for India. 
Moreover, both bidder and target companies are classified into industry groups based on their 
primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Following previously suggested classification 
of such data (Ghemawat, 2001; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005), we classify companies into eight 
main industries: Primary sector (Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry and Mining), Construction, 
Manufacturing, Transportation, Wholesale trade, Retail trade, Financial sector (banks, insurance 
companies, real estate, etc.), and Services. Finally, national cultural dimensions PDI, IDV, MAS and 
UAI were collected for each country in our sample from Geert Hofstede’s website. 
 
4.2. Sample description 
Table 1 summarizes our final sample of Chinese deals (Panel A) and Indian deals (Panel B). In 
both countries, most cross-border acquisitions involve a manufacturing bidder (51-54%). Moreover, 
Indian service companies employ cross-border M&As to expand their competitive advantage, 
representing one third (34%) of all Indian deals in our sample. In China, the second biggest industry 
represented in cross-border transactions is the financial industry (19%) whereas bidders from the 
service industry represent only 8% of Chinese deals. Regarding the target country, the U.S. has the 
priority for Indian acquirers, followed by the U.K., Singapore and Germany. For Chinese companies 
seeking cross-border M&As to expand foreign investment, Hong Kong is the prime target region, 
followed by Australia, Singapore and Japan. Although both Indian and Chinese acquirers favored 
developed countries for their cross-border transactions (83%-84%), Indian acquirers seem to be more 
“outgoing”. Three of the four top ranking target countries for Indian companies are traditional 
Western industrialized countries, while the top four target countries in the Chinese list are all from 
neighboring Asian-Pacific region. Regarding the cultural distance, English-speaking countries are 
more inclined to attract Indian cross-border M&A investment, with 70% of all Indian deals. On the 
contrary, only 36% of Chinese deals occurred in Chinese-speaking countries, partly because only few 
countries and regions use Chinese as official language. Language and cultural distance are potentially 
a bigger problem for Chinese acquirers. One interesting and important characteristic of Chinese cross-
border M&As is that 62% of deals are conducted by state-owned acquirers, which demonstrates the 
importance of state-holding capital in the Chinese economy. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4.3. Event study 
In order to assess the short-term performance of a particular deal, we use a standard event study 
methodology and compute daily abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement date. 
Following Brown & Warner (1985) and Bouwman, Fuller, & Nain (2009), we use the modified 
market model which defines abnormal returns (AR) for any day as the difference between the bidder 
return and the market return: 
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mtitit RRAR  ,            (1) 
where Rit is the daily return on the acquirer and Rmt is the daily return on the market. We thus consider 
market returns as “normal returns” for the bidder’s stock, and we discuss our choice in Section 6. The 
event study methodology assumes that stock markets are efficient, i.e., that any new information is 
instantaneously incorporated in stock prices. M&A event studies in developed markets generally use a 
short event window (3 days) around the announcement date. Since emerging markets are not as 
efficient (due to imperfect regulatory environment, insider trading, etc.), we use a 5-day event window 
to test the market response in these two emerging economies (a longer event window could dilute the 
announcement effect). 
We thus compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) by summing the daily abnormal returns 
over a 5-day event window, running from 3 days before the announcement date to 1 day after. For 
each deal, the cumulative abnormal return is:  




1
3t
iti ARCAR              (2) 
Table 2 presents the daily average abnormal returns (AAR) and the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) over the event window (-3; +1) for Chinese and Indian deals respectively. In China 
(Panel A), only the AAR(-3) and AAR(-2) are significantly positive according to the t-statistic. In 
India (Panel B), only the AAR(0) is significantly positive. The CAAR(-3;+1) for Chinese and Indian 
acquirers are both highly significant and positive. Following previous literature (Aybar & Ficici, 
2009; Bhagat, et al., 2011; Gubbi, et al., 2010), we conduct a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR), also 
known as the Wilcoxon matched-pairs test. This is the non-parametric equivalent of the paired t-test; 
i.e., we test the median difference (instead of the mean difference) in paired data. This confirmatory 
non-parametric test is important as our data sample includes potentially significant outliers. The WSR 
test confirms our findings as both CAAR are highly significant (55% of all acquirers experienced a 
significantly positive CAR).  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4.4. Cross-sectional model specifications 
In order to test our hypotheses, a series of cross-sectional regressions were estimated with 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as dependent variables for China and India. The basic model 
specification consists of regressions with only control variables included as independent variables: 
ii8i7i6i5
i4i3i2i10i
STATECOUNPRESINDPRESPRIVATE
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


    (3) 
CASHi is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is cash-financed, zero otherwise. 
RELATIVESIZEi is the deal value divided by the bidder’s pre-acquisition market value. 
PERCENTACQi is the percentage stake acquired through the transaction. RELATEDNESSi is a 
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dummy variable which equals one if the target’s main industry is the same as the acquirer, zero 
otherwise. PRIVATEi is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is privately held, zero otherwise. 
INDPRESi and COUNPRESi are dummy variables that account for the bidder’s prior experience in 
acquiring a company in the same industry (country) as the current target. STATEi is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bidder is state-owned, zero otherwise. This last variable is relevant only for 
Chinese deals. 
Once we estimated this multivariate model for Indian and Chinese deals respectively (Model 1), 
we ran similar regressions including alternatively each predictor variable in the model: 
MANUFACTURING (SERVICES) for Model 2, DEVELOPED for Model 3, and five cultural 
distance proxies (CD_PDI, CD_IDV, CD_MAS, CD_UAI and CD_COMPOSITE) for Models 4-8. 
These variables have been defined in Section 3.4. As emphasized below (and in Table 3), these 
predictors are significantly correlated with each other. Inputting these variables in the same regression 
model would result in multi-collinearity problems, which is why we use separate models to test the 
explanatory power of each variable. 
 
5. Results and Analysis 
Table 3 reports the correlations between all variables used in the analysis for Chinese deals (Panel 
A) and Indian deals (Panel B). It can be seen that the independent variables have significant 
correlations with each other, especially the five CD proxies. In China, CD_COMPOSITE is highly 
correlated with CD_PDI (0.79) and CD_IDV (0.86). The same pattern appears (to a lesser extent) in 
India. Another concern arises in the Indian sample, as DEVELOPED is highly correlated with all CD 
measures, except CD_MAS. This is due to the distribution of the sample, as most Indian cross-border 
acquisitions are targeting U.S. and U.K. companies, two developed markets with a potentially high 
cultural distance with India. On the IDV dimension for instance, India encounters the largest cultural 
distance with the U.S. (CD_IDV=43) and the U.K. (CD_IDV=41). This is consistent with previous 
evidence showing that individualism is statistically correlated with national wealth (Hofstede, 1994). 
Thus using CD_IDV or for similar reasons CD_PDI and CD_COMPOSITE in order to test H3 might 
conflict with the test of H2. CD_MAS is the least correlated with DEVELOPED, representing the best 
alternative to test for the fast entry hypothesis in India. Moreover, this measure captures the potential 
impact of femininity on cross-border M&A synergies and performance (Birkinshaw, et al., 2000; Stahl 
& Voigt, 2008). 
[Table 3 about here] 
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the regression results for Chinese deals and Indian deals respectively. 
Model 1 is the regression with only control variables, Model 2 includes the competitive advantage 
dummy (MANUFACTURING for China and SERVICES for India), Model 3 includes the dummy for 
acquisitions in developed markets, and Models 4-8 test for our fast entry hypothesis with alternative 
proxies for cultural distance. Over the eight model specifications, the control variables are usually not 
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statistically significant. For China, the only exceptions are STATE (Model 2) and RELATEDNESS 
(Model 3). The significant coefficient for STATE is positive (at the 10% significance level), which is 
consistent with the fact that investors expect state-owned companies to better succeed in exploring the 
benefits of cross-border M&As (Buckley, et al., 2007; Sun, et al., 2012). In Model 3, RELATEDNESS 
is significantly negative (at the 10% level), which is contrary to what we expected and indicates that 
investors react favorably to industry diversification by Chinese companies. This result however is 
consistent with Buckley, et al. (2007) who argue that Chinese outward FDI are partly driven by risk 
aversion, and thus diversification is seen as a good way of reducing the total risk of the company. In 
India, COUNPRES is significantly positive and the constant is significantly negative in Model 5. The 
positive coefficient for prior country presence suggests that Indian MNEs benefit from previous 
acquisitions in the same target country and is consistent with Slangen (2006). 
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 
5.1. Competitive advantage hypothesis 
In Table 4 Model 2, MANUFACTURING is positive and significant at the 1% level. This is 
aligned with the global image of “Made in China”, i.e., China is well-known all around the world for 
its manufacturing industry due to availability of cheap labor and plentiful natural resources. 
Therefore, investors strongly believe that cross-border M&As from Chinese manufacturers, in the 
pursuit of strategic resources (mainly natural resources), can enhance their competitive advantage and 
thus their long-term performance. 
Similarly, Indian companies in the service industry enjoy a competitive advantage both within 
their borders and across borders (Accenture, 2006; Buckley, et al., 2012; Sun, et al., 2012); and 
investors recognize that these companies are able to further develop this advantage abroad by 
acquiring strategic (mainly advanced technology) resources. The SERVICES coefficient is positive 
and significant at the 1% level in Table 5 Model 2. 
 
5.2. Developed target country hypothesis 
The variable DEVELOPED in Model 3 is positive and significant at the 5% level for both China 
(Table 4) and India (Table 5), indicating that acquirers from both countries gain more abnormal 
returns when the target firm is located in a developed country. Developed markets have more 
advanced tangible and intangible resources and reliable institutional regulations. Through cross- 
border acquisitions, companies can enjoy these advantages and thus increase the value for their 
shareholders (Buckley, et al., 2012). Although our sample highlighted that Indian acquirers targeted 
more Western Anglo-Saxon countries and Chinese companies targeted more Australasian countries, 
both targeted mostly developed countries (83%-84%). This reflects that complementary capabilities 
and normalized institutional environment offered by developed countries have attracted more firms 
from emerging economies to expand globally (Gubbi, et al., 2010; Sun, et al., 2012). 
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5.3. Fast entry and cultural distance hypothesis 
Acquiring MNEs are more likely to choose same-language and same-culture firms as targets 
(Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001). Even though Chinese acquirers primarily target neighboring Asian-
Pacific countries (e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore), cultural distance does not play an important role in 
acquirers’ returns. In Table 4 Models 4-8, we fail to find a statistical significance for the CD variable, 
calculated either on each individual cultural dimension or as a composite index. This means that the 
organizational culture of Chinese acquirers is not recognized by shareholders as a factor that could 
ease and speed up the access to foreign markets. Chinese MNEs using cross-border acquisitions as the 
easiest way to acquire strategic assets cannot benefit from fast entry advantages, as they face high 
cultural clashes when expanding abroad. Indeed Chinese managers lack communication skills, cross-
cultural knowledge and foreign management experience (Dietz, et al., 2008), making any cross-border 
acquisition (even in geographically and/or culturally close countries) even more challenging 
(Hofstede, 1989). 
For India (Table 5 Models 4-8), cultural distance has a significant impact on bidders’ returns (5% 
significance) on the IDV and MAS dimensions, suggesting that culture is an important factor 
influencing shareholders prospective of cross-border transactions. As shown in Table 3, CD_IDV and 
CD_MAS are negatively correlated in India (-0.36), hence the opposite sign between both coefficients 
(positive for IDV and negative for MAS) was expected. However we have also emphasized at the 
beginning of section 5 that all CD measures (except CD_MAS) are highly correlated with the variable 
DEVELOPED (H2). Thus the CD_IDV variable may be interpreted as another measure of the 
economic development of the target country (as India faces the largest IDV distance with developed 
countries such as U.S. and U.K.), and the significance of the coefficient in Model 5 is consistent with 
our result for H2 (Model 3). As suggested earlier, CD_MAS is our best proxy for testing H3, and the 
coefficient is consistent with our fast entry hypothesis. The negative sign implies that Indian bidders 
earn higher returns when targeting culturally close countries. India enjoys the advantage of being a 
commonwealth country with a long-term influence from western countries as well as having high 
multinational communication skills (Buckley, et al., 2012). When both the bidder and the target 
companies share a common culture (e.g. the same language), the international transaction has less 
obstacles and more chance of rapid success (Buckley, et al., 2012). Moreover, India is characterized as 
a feminine society (small MAS score), and when targeting other feminine countries (with a small 
cultural distance on MAS), bidders are able to further improve the realization of M&A synergies 
(Birkinshaw, et al., 2000; Stahl & Voigt, 2008). Thus shareholders recognize the cultural advantage of 
Indian MNEs as an accelerating factor in the race for accessing new markets and strategic assets. 
Finally, in order to compare the impact of cultural distance on the performance of Chinese and 
Indian acquirers, we perform a z-test for the difference in regression coefficients, consistent with 
previous empirical studies in international business (Danis, De Clercq, & Petricevic, 2011). In support 
of H3, the CD_COMPOSITE coefficient is significantly higher for India than for China (z-value = 
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12.60). Similarly, the z-value is strongly significant for the CD_IDV (19.88) and CD_MAS (-13.20) 
components. These results are consistent with the fact that Chinese companies, because of higher 
liabilities of foreignness, cannot benefit from a fast entry into foreign markets as Indian companies do. 
Overall, our regression results are consistent with our hypotheses. Regarding H1, both Chinese 
and Indian acquirers create significant abnormal returns when they expand their competitive 
advantage abroad. With respect to H2, both countries tend to acquire target firms in more developed 
economies and produce higher cumulative abnormal returns. These results suggest that strategic 
resource seeking is an important motivation for cross-border acquisitions from both Chinese and 
Indian bidders, although they target different kinds of strategic resources – Chinese acquirers are more 
interested in natural resources whereas Indian companies are seeking more advanced resources (e.g. 
technological). Comparatively, Indian bidders significantly benefit from a fast entry into culturally 
close countries, especially in countries sharing a feminine organizational orientation (characterized by 
trust and mutual respect). 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion  
With the remarkable economic achievements made by China and India in the recent decades, 
MNEs from these two fast-growing economies have been playing an increasingly important role in 
the world’s M&A activity. Aligned with this trend, issues such as the performance, motivation and 
other facets of international acquisitions from EM companies are gaining interest in the academic 
literature, although remaining at an early stage. Our research enriches the extant literature by formally 
testing different motives for cross-border acquisitions and examining their impact on the bidder’s 
performance, as well as comparing between two emerging markets: China and India. 
We hypothesize that traditional motives for cross-border deals that have been emphasized in the 
context of developed-market acquirers are not all relevant in the case of bidding companies from 
emerging markets. Moreover, we argue that companies located in different emerging countries (e.g. 
China and India) will have different motivations to expand abroad, based on specific characteristics of 
the home country as well as its relatedness to the target country. The two main motivations for EM 
firms acquiring foreign targets are strategic resource seeking and fast entry to foreign markets. On one 
side, strategic resource seeking is an important motivation for cross-border acquisitions from both 
Chinese and Indian bidders. However, Chinese companies are more interested in securing natural 
resources and acquiring superior managerial skills (Accenture, 2006; Dietz, et al., 2008; Sun, et al., 
2012); whereas Indian companies are seeking more advanced resources such as leading technologies 
and knowledge-based abilities (Buckley, et al., 2012). On the other side, the fast entry to foreign 
markets is a key motive for Indian acquirers who use foreign acquisitions to fulfill their need to 
rapidly gain new markets (Accenture Report, 2006). As a consequence of India being a former British 
colony and a more feminine society, Indian firms have higher multinational communication skills, 
fewer obstacles for global integration and easier access to new product and client markets. Thus 
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Indian companies enjoy a cultural advantage when targeting foreign markets, especially developed 
economies and countries sharing a feminine culture in the organization. This fast entry hypothesis is 
not a relevant motivation for Chinese bidders who face a high potential clash of culture when 
acquiring foreign companies. Indeed many Chinese managers crucially lack fluent communication 
skills, cross-cultural knowledge, foreign management experience and fluency in English (Dietz, et al., 
2008). 
Using a sample of cross-border acquisitions from China (63 deals) and India (203 deals) over the 
period 2000-2010, we investigate these motives by examining the short-term reaction of the bidder’s 
shareholders around the deal announcement date, following a standard event study methodology 
combined with a multivariate regression analysis. Our results support our hypotheses and can be 
summarized as follows. In the preliminary univariate analysis, we find a significant cross-border 
effect, i.e., acquiring firms from both countries earn abnormal returns when they announce a cross-
border transaction. This is consistent with previous findings of a cross-border effect in Indian 
acquisitions (Gubbi, et al., 2010). We explain these abnormal returns in our cross-sectional analysis by 
testing for three alternative hypotheses and controlling for various deal and bidder characteristics. 
First, shareholders of bidding companies in both China and India recognize the competitive advantage 
these firms enjoy in their respective industry and the motive for expanding this competitive advantage 
abroad. Chinese firms have a competitive advantage in the manufacturing industry and we find that 
manufacturing companies earn a significant premium of 3.8% (equivalent to 15% monthly) in their 
cross-border acquisitions. Similarly, Indian companies that operate in the service industry earn a 
positive abnormal return of 2.5% (about 10% monthly) when expanding their competitive advantage 
across their borders. The great achievements and rapid growth of developing-country MNEs in the 
recent years have given their shareholders more confidence to their business success when these 
companies seek cross-border M&As for strategic expansions. Second, cross-border deals targeting 
developed countries create value for both Chinese and Indian investors. This value creation amounts 
5.4% for Chinese bidders and 2.2% for Indian companies. This result is consistent with EM 
companies using cross-border M&As to pursue better resources, larger market access and stronger 
competitive advantage. As Gubbi, et al. (2010) have pointed out, developed countries have better 
quality of resources and institutions, leading to stronger synergies of the acquisition deals. Finally, we 
demonstrate the importance of minimal cultural distance as a fast entry mode for Indian acquirers. 
Using different proxies of cultural distance, we find that Indian acquirers generate additional value 
when targeting culturally close markets, especially countries with a minimal distance on the 
masculinity-femininity index (Hofstede, 1980). This result uncovers the importance of organizational 
culture for business success. Cultural closeness, especially in feminine societies characterized by 
mutual respect and trust, is essential in the process of business integration, even more when a cross-
border acquisition has been chosen as the fastest mode of entry into foreign markets. Consistent with 
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our hypothesis, Chinese acquirers have a cultural disadvantage in foreign markets and do not benefit 
from targeting countries with a similar culture. 
Our paper is not without some limitations, summarized below along with some suggestions for 
future areas of research. First, our sample of Chinese cross-border deals is still very limited. From an 
original list of 256 completed cross-border M&A deals undertaken by listed Chinese acquirers over 
the period 2000-2010 (from Thomson One), we were able to match only 63 acquisition deals with 
DataStream  – after applying the criteria that acquirers are listed on either Shenzhen or Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, with full characteristics information.2 The criterion to retain only publicly listed 
companies with daily stock market data available around the announcement date is necessary to apply 
the event study methodology. We thus acknowledge that our results might not hold for private 
companies who might have different motivations for acquisitions, especially foreign acquisitions. 
Moreover, by analyzing the short-term reaction of shareholders, we do not make any predictions about 
the long-term performance of these cross-border acquisitions. A positive short-term performance does 
not necessarily imply the long-term success of the international business integration. The idea of our 
paper was to investigate how shareholders recognize and value the intrinsic motives behind foreign 
M&A investments. Future research can be to examine the motivations of private companies from 
emerging markets to expand abroad and/or analyze the long-term performance of these international 
M&As. As Chinese MNEs are increasingly part of the global M&A activity, future research will 
naturally enjoy a more comprehensive field of study in this area. Second, the modified market model 
used in this article to calculate abnormal returns is one among others, and we recognize that using 
market returns as “normal returns” might seem simplistic. Several models have been used to compute 
bidders’ abnormal returns, the most common being the market model which estimates normal returns 
for the bidder over a period of few months before the event (Brown & Warner, 1985). However, as our 
sample includes several consecutive deals (i.e., the same company announcing different acquisitions 
within the same couple of months), we would lose a significant number of deals by using the market 
model (as any estimation period including another announcement cannot be considered as “normal”). 
In order to include as many transactions as possible in our analysis, we use the modified market 
model to compute abnormal returns which has also been used in other event studies (Bouwman, et al., 
2009; Brown & Warner, 1985). Moreover, Brown and Warner (1985) do no find any evidence that one 
model performs better than the other; they even show that more complicated methodologies can make 
the analysis worse of. Future research into emerging-country M&As might develop a more 
appropriate model taking into account the specificities of stock markets in these countries. The choice 
                                                             
2 As our sample includes nearly four times more Indian deals than Chinese deals, we also carried out a matched-
sample analysis of CAAR. The matched sample is designed according to the following criteria. First, we find 
the deals that occurred in the same announcement period, i.e. one year range around the announcement date. 
Second, we match remaining deals within the same bidder industry. Last, deals are gathered from the smallest 
difference in the market value of both bidding firms. In this case, the CAAR for both countries is still positive 
(significant only for China). 
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of the event window, with regard to the efficiency of the stock market, is an example of an empirical 
issue that still needs to be explored. 
To summarize, our study contributes to the extant growing literature focusing on EM firms 
expanding across their borders by acquiring foreign companies, mainly in more developed countries. 
We have evidenced that strategic resource seeking and fast entry to foreign markets are rational 
motives for choosing M&As as a mean of internationalization, and that shareholders recognize and 
value such motives. EM companies enjoying a strong competitive advantage in their industry and 
country can easily expand this advantage abroad by acquiring foreign targets. Cross-border M&A 
activity, as the main mode of internationalization from EM firms, still needs more in-depth and 
advanced studies in order to offer a comprehensive understanding of the motives and performance of 
such events. 
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Table 1: Regression sample description 
 
Panel A: China Number of deals     Number of deals 
Acquirer industry   Target country   
Primary sector   7 Hong Kong  15 
Retail   1 Australia   9 
Wholesale   2 Singapore   5 
Transport   2 Japan   4 
Services   5 The United Kingdom  3 
Financial   12 Germany   3 
Manufacturing  34 Others   24 
  Total: 63   Total: 63 
        
Target market status   Target country official language 
Developed   53 Chinese   23 
Developing  10 Others   40 
  Total:  63   Total: 63 
       
    Acquirer status   
    State-owned  39 
  Others   24 
      Total: 63 
     
Panel B: India  Number of deals     Number of deals 
Acquirer industry   Target country   
Primary sector   7 The United States  65 
Construction  7 The United Kingdom  29 
Wholesale   3 Singapore   12 
Transport   7 Germany   11 
Financial   6 France   9 
Services   69 South Africa  8 
Manufacturing  104 Others   69 
  Total: 203   Total: 203 
        
Target market status   Target country official language 
Developed   168 English  141 
Developing  35 Others   62 
  Total:   203    Total: 203 
     
The table presents the deal characteristics of Chinese and Indian cross-border acquisitions between January 
2000 and December 2010. The regression sample includes cross-border deals for which information is available 
for all control variables. 
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Table 2: Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
 
Panel A: China (n=79) 
 Mean Median s.d. t-stat positive:negative %positive WSR test 
AAR(-3) 0.0068 0.0034 0.028 2.15** 42:34 53.16% 1.75* 
AAR(-2) 0.0059 -0.0011 0.027 1.90* 35:42 44.30% 0.70 
AAR(-1) 0.0038 0.0011 0.025 1.31 41:37 51.90% 0.73 
AAR(0) 0.0023 0.0000 0.028 0.82 38:38 48.10% 0.25 
AAR(+1) 0.0031 0.0000 0.021 1.30 38:38 48.10% 0.52 
        
CAAR(-3;+1) 0.0219 0.0178 0.054 3.57*** 44:34 55.70% 3.24*** 
 
Panel B: India (n=310) 
 Mean Median s.d. t-stat positive:negative %positive WSR test 
AAR(-3) -0.0002 -0.0022 0.024 -0.13 139:170 45.84% 1.14 
AAR(-2) 0.0019 0.0004 0.028 1.19 157:153 50.65% 0.80 
AAR(-1) 0.0001 -0.0027 0.168 0.07 143:166 46.10% 0.93 
AAR(0) 0.0100 0.0053 0.037 4.67*** 179:131 57.74% 4.39*** 
AAR(+1) 0.0003 0.0002 0.028 0.20 156:154 50.32% 0.17 
        
CAAR(-3;+1) 0.0122 0.0056 0.061 3.50*** 172:138 55.48% 2.84*** 
        
The table gives daily AARs over the event window as well as CAARs as the average of CAR(-3;+1) for each 
country. The sample is larger than in Table 1 as it includes all cross-border deals for which stock market data is 
available over the event window. s.d. denotes the standard deviation. One sample t-test statistics for significance of 
AAR and CAAR are calculated. WSR is the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which tests for the significance of positive 
or negative market movement. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 3: Variables’ correlation matrices 
Panel A: China                
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 CAR(-3,+1)  1.00               
2 MANUFACTURING  0.21*  1.00              
3 DEVELOPED  0.31** -0.03  1.00             
4 CD_PDI  0.00 -0.12  0.16  1.00            
5 CD_IDV  0.02 -0.02  0.14  0.87***  1.00           
6 CD_MAS  0.00 -0.02 -0.41*** -0.30** -0.33***  1.00          
7 CD_UAI -0.11  0.27** -0.38***  0.03  0.15  0.54***  1.00         
8 CD_COMPOSITE -0.02  0.06 -0.08  0.79***  0.86***  0.07  0.57***  1.00               
9 RELATEDNESS -0.15 -0.31** -0.02  0.13  0.10 -0.04  0.05  0.09  1.00       
10 INDPRES  0.01  0.10  0.15  0.08  0.06  0.04 -0.09  0.04 -0.52***  1.00      
11 COUNPRES -0.03  0.12 -0.01  0.26**  0.21  0.17  0.30**  0.33***  0.12  0.19  1.00     
12 RELATIVESIZE -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.36***  1.00    
13 CASH -0.02 -0.28**  0.06 -0.06 -0.09  0.16 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12 -0.06 -0.30**  0.08  1.00   
14 PRIVATE -0.14  0.20 -0.10  0.21  0.11  0.00  0.07  0.13  0.18 -0.06  0.19 -0.15 -0.22*  1.00  
15 PERCENTACQ -0.02  0.05  0.04  0.14  0.06  0.03 -0.03  0.08  0.12  0.05  0.23*  0.18 -0.16  0.11  1.00 
16 STATE  0.09 -0.46*** -0.06  0.15  0.17 -0.06 -0.10  0.12  0.19 -0.05 -0.23*  0.25*  0.10 -0.35*** -0.18 
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Panel B: India                
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14   
1 CAR(-3,+1)  1.00              
 2 SERVICES  0.18**  1.00             
 3 DEVELOPED  0.13*  0.13*  1.00            
 4 CD_PDI  0.09  0.07  0.46***  1.00           
 5 CD_IDV  0.13*  0.19***  0.51***  0.47***  1.00          
 6 CD_MAS -0.12* -0.14*  0.12*  0.05 -0.36***  1.00         
 7 CD_UAI -0.06 -0.13* -0.22*** -0.71*** -0.71***  0.29***  1.00        
 8 CD_COMPOSITE  0.09  0.03  0.67***  0.60***  0.44***  0.39*** -0.13*  1.00               
9 RELATEDNESS  0.03  0.12* -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01  0.07  0.01  1.00      
 10 INDPRES  0.00 -0.04  0.09  0.10  0.05  0.00 -0.06  0.04 -0.61***  1.00     
 11 COUNPRES  0.08 -0.12* -0.23*** -0.16** -0.32***  0.14*  0.24*** -0.13*  0.03  0.06  1.00    
 12 RELATIVESIZE  0.04  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.09  0.05 -0.10  0.00  0.00 -0.02  0.05  1.00   
 13 CASH  0.04 -0.10  0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10  0.06 -0.02  0.18** -0.21*** -0.07  0.13*  1.00  
 14 PRIVATE  0.09  0.19**  0.16**  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.19*** -0.09  0.09  0.02 -0.16** -0.07  1.00 
 15 PERCENTACQ -0.04  0.02 -0.11 -0.13* -0.02 -0.07  0.03 -0.12* -0.12*  0.03 -0.03  0.00  0.02  0.03 
                                  
CAR, cumulative abnormal return; DEVELOPED, developed target country; CD_PDI, “power distance index” cultural distance; CD_IDV, “individuality-collectivism” 
cultural distance; CD_MAS, “masculinity-femininity” cultural distance; CD_UAI, “uncertainty avoidance index” cultural distance; CD_COMPOSITE, composite index of 
cultural distance; RELATEDNESS, same-industry target; INDPRES, prior industry presence; COUNPRES, prior country presence; RELATIVESIZE, deal value divided by 
market value of bidder; CASH, cash-financed acquisition; PRIVATE, private target; PERCENTACQ, percent stake acquired in the transaction; STATE, state-owned bidder. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 4: Results of OLS regressions for Chinese deals (63 deals) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
MANUFACTURING   0.0377 ***             
   
(2.71)              DEVELOPED     0.0537 **           
     
(2.54)            CD_PDI 
      
0.0000 
         
       
(0.05) 
         CD_IDV 
        
0.0000 
       
         
(0.04) 
       CD_MAS 
          
0.0000 
     
           
(-0.03) 
     CD_UAI 
            
-0.0003 
   
             
(-0.89) 
   CD_COMPOSITE 
              
-0.0001 
 
               
(-0.35) 
 CASH -0.0084  0.0035  -0.0106  -0.0060  
-0.0060 
 
-0.0059 
 
-0.0066 
 
-0.0057 
 
 
(-0.55)  (0.23)  (-0.74)  (-0.39)  
(-0.38) 
 
(-0.36) 
 
(-0.43) 
 
(-0.37) 
 RELATIVESIZE -0.001  -0.001  -0.0007  -0.0009  
-0.0009 
 
-0.0009 
 
-0.0009 
 
-0.0009 
 
 
(-1.04)  (-1.34)  (-0.75)  (-1.01)  
(-1.01) 
 
(-1.02) 
 
(-0.98) 
 
(-1.36) 
 PERCENTACQ 0.0106  0.0116  0.0085  0.0136  
0.0137 
 
0.0138 
 
0.0118 
 
0.0141 
 
 
(0.45)  (0.49)  (0.37)  (0.57)  
(0.59) 
 
(0.6) 
 
(0.5) 
 
(0.59) 
 RELATEDNESS -0.031  -0.0169  -0.0394 * -0.0287  
-0.0287 
 
-0.0287 
 
-0.0297 
 
-0.0290 
 
 
(-1.38)  (-0.76)  (-1.69)  (-1.33)  
(-1.32) 
 
(-1.32) 
 
(-1.35) 
 
(-1.4) 
 PRIVATE -0.0124  -0.0149  -0.0053  -0.0152  
-0.0151 
 
-0.0150 
 
-0.0152 
 
-0.0140 
 
 
(-0.59)  (-0.69)  (-0.28)  (-0.75)  
(-0.73) 
 
(-0.7) 
 
(-0.74) 
 
(-0.8) 
 INDPRES -0.0262  -0.0196  -0.0426  -0.0280  
-0.0279 
 
-0.0279 
 
-0.0322 
 
-0.0283 
 
 
(-1.07)  (-0.80)  (-1.65)  (-1.23)  
(-1.22) 
 
(-1.21) 
 
(-1.36) 
 
(-1.3) 
 COUNPRES 0.0021  0.0025  0.0069  0.0063  
0.0064 
 
0.0066 
 
0.0115 
 
0.0087 
 
 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.36)  (0.28)  
(0.29) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.32) 
 STATE 0.0193  0.0352 * 0.0252  0.0215  
0.0215 
 
0.0217 
 
0.0213 
 
0.0233 
 
 
(0.94)  (1.78)  (1.29)  (0.9)  
(0.89) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(1.07) 
 Constant 0.0378  -0.0088  -0.0061  0.0318  
0.0319 
 
0.0322 
 
0.0408 
 
0.0350 
 
 
(1.31)  (-0.30)  (-0.17)  (1.12)  
(1.12) 
 
(1.07) 
 
(1.36) 
 
(1.38) 
 
                 R-squared 0.069   0.140   0.186   0.078  0.078  0.078  0.092  0.080   
The dependent variable is CAR (-3, +1) in each regression. MANUFACTURING takes the value of one if the bidder’s main 
activity is in the manufacturing industry, zero otherwise. DEVELOPED takes value of one if the host country is a member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and/or a member of the advanced economies list from the 
International Monetary Fund, zero otherwise. CD_PDI, CD_IDV, CD_MAS and CD_UAI are cultural distances between China 
and the target country in each individual dimension. CD_COMPOSITE is the composite index based on all four individual 
dimensions. CASH equals one if the acquisition is cash-financed, zero otherwise. RELATIVESIZE is the deal value divided by 
the bidder’s market value pre-acquisition. PERCENTACQ is the percentage stake acquired through the transaction. 
RELATEDNESS equals one if the target’s main industry is the same as the acquirer, zero otherwise. PRIVATE equals one if the 
target is privately held, zero otherwise. INDPRES and COUNPRES are equal to one if the bidder previously acquired a company 
in the same industry (country) as the current target. STATE equals one if the bidder is state-owned, zero otherwise. T-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis, computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 5: Results of OLS regressions for Indian deals (203 deals) 
  Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
SERVICES 
  
0.0249 *** 
            
   
(2.66) 
             DEVELOPED 
    
0.0218 ** 
          
     
(2.14) 
           CD_PDI 
      
0.0004 
         
       
(1.42) 
         CD_IDV 
        
0.0009 ** 
      
         
(2.43) 
       CD_MAS 
          
-0.0012 ** 
    
           
(-2.56) 
     CD_UAI 
            
-0.0004 
   
             
(-1.53) 
   CD_COMPOSITE 
              
0.0006 
 
               
(1.10) 
 CASH 0.0061 
 
0.0094 
 
0.0051 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0052 
 
0.0021 
 
0.0051 
 
0.0042 
 
 
(0.67) 
 
(1.06) 
 
(0.57) 
 
(0.5) 
 
(0.57) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.46) 
 RELATIVESIZE 0.0105 
 
0.0079 
 
0.0081 
 
0.0143 
 
0.0106 
 
0.0175 
 
0.0130 
 
0.0142 
 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.59) 
 
(0.43) 
 
(0.46) 
 PERCENTACQ -0.0001 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.000 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0001 
 
-0.0001 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0000 
 
 
(-0.41) 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(-0.19) 
 
(-0.11) 
 
(-0.21) 
 
(-0.39) 
 
(-0.24) 
 
(-0.15) 
 RELATEDNESS 0.005 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0052 
 
0.0071 
 
0.0075 
 
0.0064 
 
0.0074 
 
0.0064 
 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.74) 
 
(0.79) 
 
(0.7) 
 
(0.78) 
 
(0.66) 
 PRIVATE 0.0127 
 
0.0078 
 
0.0097 
 
0.0102 
 
0.0096 
 
0.0119 
 
0.0115 
 
0.0088 
 
 
(1.49) 
 
(0.93) 
 
(1.14) 
 
(1.17) 
 
(1.13) 
 
(1.38) 
 
(1.31) 
 
(1.00) 
 INDPRES 0.0038 
 
0.0027 
 
0.0017 
 
0.0077 
 
0.0083 
 
0.0080 
 
0.0087 
 
0.0085 
 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.57) 
 
(0.55) 
 COUNPRES 0.0098 
 
0.0133 
 
0.0139 
 
0.0136 
 
0.0185 * 0.0139 
 
0.0144 
 
0.0129 
 
 
(1.07) 
 
(1.48) 
 
(1.48) 
 
(1.45) 
 
(1.91) 
 
(1.46) 
 
(1.5) 
 
(1.36) 
 Constant -0.0035 
 
-0.0085 
 
-0.0218 
 
-0.0190 
 
-0.0383 ** 0.0060 
 
-0.0006 
 
-0.0369 
 
 
(-0.35) 
 
(-0.86) 
 
(-1.61) 
 
(-1.26) 
 
(-2.12) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(-0.06) 
 
(-1.17) 
 
                 R-squared 0.022  0.055  0.038  0.032  0.047  0.043  0.031  0.029  
The dependent variable is CAR (-3, +1) in each regression. SERVICES takes the value of one if the bidder’s main activity is 
in the services industry, zero otherwise. DEVELOPED takes value of one if the host country is a member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and/or a member of the advanced economies list from the 
International Monetary Fund, zero otherwise. CD_PDI, CD_IDV, CD_MAS and CD_UAI are cultural distances between 
India and the target country in each individual dimension. CD_COMPOSITE is the composite index based on all four 
individual dimensions. CASH equals one if the acquisition is cash-financed, zero otherwise. RELATIVESIZE is the deal 
value divided by the bidder’s market value pre-acquisition. PERCENTACQ is the percentage stake acquired through the 
transaction. RELATEDNESS equals one if the target’s main industry is the same as the acquirer, zero otherwise. PRIVATE 
equals one if the target is privately held, zero otherwise. INDPRES and COUNPRES are equal to one if the bidder 
previously acquired a company in the same industry (country) as the current target. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis, 
computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Completed cross-border deals by Chinese firms from 2000 to 2010 
 
 
Source: Thomson One  
 
 
Figure 2: Completed cross-border deals by Indian firms from 2000 to 2010 
 
 
Source: Thomson One  
 
